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“The Myth of Law and Literature”
Bernadette Meyler1
Reviewing Thane Rosenbaum, The Myth of Moral Justice: Why Our Legal System Fails
to Do What’s Right (New York: HarperCollins, 2004).
In The Myth of Moral Justice, Thane Rosenbaum generates an ambitious and
idealistic plan for a rapprochement between law and morality, between emotion and
reason, and between law and its literary representations. Laudable and inspiring,
Rosenbaum’s project remains flawed in several ways that are traceable back to his
reliance on aspects of law and literature scholarship. Unfortunately, Rosenbaum’s
attempt to replace the myth of moral justice with a truly moral legal system depends itself
on a particular set of myths about law and literature.
Rosenbaum’s acknowledgements express indebtedness to the “law and literature
movement,” and The Myth of Moral Justice draws upon classic strands of this approach.
In suggesting how the law could be brought into closer connection with what he calls
morality,2 Rosenbaum advocates replacing the current legal system with a new paradigm,
one that would emphasize the ability of all participants in a case—whether victims, or
perpetrators, or bystanders—to express their feelings with dignity in a public narrative.
The wrongdoers in this legal drama would offer sincere apologies, and the sufferers
would fully express the harms they had endured (Chap. 11). Tragedy would be averted,
however, through a restorative process (33; 39; Chap. 12). So firm is Rosenbaum’s belief
in the power of narrative that he maintains, “Put simply: The story itself is and provides
its own remedy. . . . If nothing else gets accomplished, if criminals go free and
tortfeasors succeed in causing further negligence, the telling of the story, by itself, is still
the morally correct outcome” (58). Rosenbaum even seems to echo Milton’s oftenquoted statement that “Truth will win out in the free marketplace of ideas,” insisting that
the proliferation of narratives he envisions will lead us to the truth, rather than to a legal
version of the facts (76-78).3 Indeed, he excoriates the rules of evidence and civil
procedure as “severely undermin[ing] truth and storytelling” (107-08).4 At the same
time, however, the storytelling must be carried out in public view; as a result, Rosenbaum
criticizes arbitration and mediation, which he sees as leading to secret settlements and
failing to air all parties’ grievances.5
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Rosenbaum vehemently contrasts this “private morality” with “legal ethics,” and with
“justice” as currently conceived within the legal system, which he considers “immoral
justice.” (19)
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Although expressing the belief that truth will emerge from the narratives recounted in
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This emphasis on narrative draws upon a strand of law and literature scholarship
that emerged out of feminism and critical race studies.6 As those extolling narrative in
that context insisted, “The cure [to racial and gender subordination] is storytelling.”7 For
Rosenbaum, this statement has acquired an application beyond subordinated groups, to
all aggrieved parties who express their injury through seeking out legal proceedings;
storytelling is the cure to the indignity that the legal system has foisted upon all.
A second thread of the law and literature movement is woven through The Myth
of Moral Justice, one sometimes identified as the “humanistic” approach.8 According to
this account, literature provides an insight into values beyond and above those compassed
by law—ones that the law would do well to regard. Literature likewise expresses the
emotional valences that legal proceedings suppress. Rosenbaum continually resorts to
the literary and filmic in The Myth of Moral Justice—from Shakespeare to Camus to The
Practice—as prime sources of trenchant critiques of the legal system. The law’s
rationalist perspective, Rosenbaum opines, “deprives legal standards of also being
influenced by the subjective, irrational, spiritual, and internal dynamics of the human
experience” (29). Literature provides both a critique of the law and a supplementary,
emotionally attuned vision of the reasons people seek out the law and how the law
ultimately fails them.
Although one might imagine from reading The Myth of Moral Justice that the law
and literature movement remains healthy and is, indeed, thriving, two recent articles
published in arguably the top journals of the literary and legal professions respectively
case some doubt on this assumption. In her contribution to the regular feature on “The
Changing Profession” in The Publications of the Modern Language Association,
Columbia University English Professor Julie Stone Peters attempted to explain the
failures of law and literature to bridge the gulf between law professors’ fantasies about
the literary and literary scholars’ attempts to ground themselves in the “reality” provided
by law.9 Likewise, Yale Law Professor Kenji Yoshino investigated in the Yale Law
Journal “why law and literature is anemic and why it will not die.”10 These two critiques
of law and literature illuminate certain problems that Rosenbaum’s book shares. The
most notable consist in an excessive faith in narrative, and a belief that literature provides

public record, may fail to achieve a complete moral remedy. Even mediation, . . . where
apologies have proven most effective, is limited as a mechanism for creating moral
repair, precisely because it ends in a hushed settlement agreement and not in a public
ceremony that aspires to truth- and storytelling.”); 243 (“[G]iven some of the themes of
moral justice, mediation falls short, because it suffers from the lack of a public setting
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the direction in which law should tend rather than a description of the qualities and
necessary boundaries of law as an institution.
Peters’ “Law, Literature, and the Vanishing Real” commences with a fictionalized
depiction of a seminar incorporating professors of both law and literature that is
recognizable to anyone who has participated in a similar event. The climax of the event
occurs when the literature professor co-directing the seminar storms out of the room, but
the signs of disrepair are evident much earlier. The individuals within each discipline
endorse a phantasmatic vision of the other field, the Shakespearean exclaiming how he
would “like to use law to end poverty, racism, and war” and a family law professor
expressing the desire to “recognize the power of legal narrative as a tool of liberation for
women and people of color.”11
Examining three phases of law and literature—those of “humanism,”
“hermeneutics,” and “narrative,” Peters then illuminates how the supposedly
interdisciplinary project of law and literature became one of redisciplining, where each
discipline exaggerated the characteristics of the other: “Law seemed, to the literary
scholar longing for the political real, a sphere in which language really made things
happen. Literature seemed, to the legal scholar longing for the critical-humanist real, a
sphere in which language could stand outside the oppressive state apparatus, speaking
truth to the law’s obfuscations and subterfuges.”12 The only way to escape this
interdisciplinary impasse, Peters insists, is to move beyond these illusions and into a
disciplinary flexibility and multiplicity that will confute standardized attempts at
definition. Hence she sees with optimism the replacement of “law and literature” by
something like “law, culture, and the humanities.”13
Confronting the same state of disrepair in the “law-and-literature enterprise,”14
Yoshino’s “The City and the Poet” advocates re-evaluating and reintroducing the muchreviled Platonic approach to the place of poetry in relation to the state.15 Plato famously
excluded poets—at least of the imitative variety—from his ideal polity in the Republic,
although dialogues like the Phaedrus and the Laws qualify this seemingly stark stance.
According to Yoshino, Plato’s reasoning remains salient both in assessing what
“literature” can bring to legal processes and in determining why a narrative impulse may
clash with legal scholarship. The Platonic critique of poetry consists, for Yoshino, in the
notion that poetry is false, irrational, and seductive.16 From his account of Plato, Yoshino
extracts three maxims: “poetry can be permitted only if it does not conflict with state
functions”; “poetry cannot evade being held accountable to those functions by asserting
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the defense that it is ineradicable”; and “poetry will only be permitted if it can
affirmatively show that it can fulfill state functions.”17
Attempting to apply this Platonic paradigm to the law and to legal academia,
Yoshino focuses largely on the third of the criteria he articulates, which he dubs the
“virtue defense,” and which entails “showing that [poetry’s] ‘doctrines seem the same as
or better than’ those of the state.”18 Examining the Supreme Court’s shifting stance on
whether to admit victim impact statements in death penalty cases, statements that
unquestionably do reach jurors emotionally, Yoshino explains that, in deciding to allow
these narratives into the courtroom, the Supreme Court ultimately expressed a normative
view about the weight of emotion that the law should permit to be mustered on the side of
the state in relation to that brought in by the defendant in the form of character
testimony.19 After expressing disagreement with this result, although not the Platonic
method employed to reach it, Yoshino then turns to the use of narrative in legal articles,
and, in particular, Columbia Law Professor Patricia Williams’ story of being excluded
from a Benetton store, presumably on account of race.20 While the reader may respond to
this account with emotion, the genre of legal scholarship, in contrast to that of a criminal
trial, should, Yoshino believes, be sufficiently flexible and open to experimentation to
permit the employment of personal stories.21 In both cases, the “virtue defense” is what
will redeem literature—or fail in trying.
It may not be incidental that, although he does not address this point, Yoshino’s
examples all consist in autobiographical statements, and ones that may not, he
acknowledges, possess the same problems of “falsity” as the poetry Plato targets for
criticism.22 By its very nature, autobiography clouds the distinction between truth and
falsity. It is in autobiography that the greatest claims for veracity are made and also the
most significant departures from an exact account of “the facts.” The subject of
autobiography, rather than articulating the contours of a pre-determined self, presents a
picture already outlined by the genre into which she is inscribing herself. As Natalie
Zemon Davis discovered of tales told by pardon seekers in sixteenth-century France,
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autobiographical narratives are likely to play to the cultural concerns of the day and may
assume a form that is more standardized than individualized.23
Literary theory has sustained a long-term fascination with autobiography, and
deconstructive work, in particular, has focused upon the relationship between the identity
supposed to exist before the commencement of the work of autobiography and that
generated out of the language and rhetoric of autobiography itself. As Paul de Man once
trenchantly inquired: “[A]re we so certain that autobiography depends on reference, as a
photograph depends on its subject of a (realistic) picture on its model? We assume that
life produces the autobiography as an act produces its consequences, but can we not
suggest, with equal justice, that the autobiographical project may itself produce and
determine the life and that whatever the writer does is in fact governed by the technical
demands of self-portraiture and thus determined, in all its aspects, by the resources of his
medium?”24 The form of autobiography directs its energies toward insisting on the
reality of its subject, while at the same time that very subject is constructed out of the
generic conventions, and the language itself, of the autobiographical narrative.
The lack of identity between the position from which one is speaking and the
content of one’s speech is what offends Plato about “imitative poets” in particular—in
other words, those who speak in the first person through different characters rather than
recounting a third-person narrative.25 These poets ventriloquize without embodying,
appearing to speak from a subject position that they might not “really” occupy, or might,
in effect, only be persuading themselves to occupy.26 It is, in part, this autobiographical
effect that renders such imitative poets problematic to Plato. The two principal
objections against poetry concern its impact on the auditor and its consequences for the
poet himself. As we can discern from the tenth book of the Republic, mimesis possesses
the drawback of representing “reality” at two removes; if the “forms” are, for Plato, the
ideal, quotidian objects represent these forms in reduced version, while imitation copies
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See generally Natalie Zemon Davis, Fictions in the Archives: Pardon Tales and their
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24
Paul de Man, “Autobiography as De-Facement,” in The Rhetoric of Romanticism (New
York: Columbia UP, 1984): 69. See also, Jacques Derrida, The Monolingualism of the
Other, trans. Patrick Mensah (Palo Alto: Stanford UP, 1998): 29 (“[I]t is well known that
the I . . . called autobiographical, the I [je-me] of I recall [je me rappelle] is produced and
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therefore it is not independent of language in general. This is something well known but
rarely taken into consideration by those dealing in general with autobiography—whether
this genre is literary or not, whether it is considered, moreover, as a genre or not.”).
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See generally, Plato, Republic bk. 3, 2d ed., ed. and trans. Allan Bloom (New York: Basic
Books, 1991).
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only these worldly realities, not the forms themselves.27 Imitation thus shows the
observer not the truth but rather a second-hand copy of it. At the same time, however,
imitative poetry adversely affects the speaker by encouraging him to assume diverse
personae rather than simply the best.28 A similar drawback might be thought to
characterize the rhetoric of the sophists—associated, not incidentally, with the law courts.
The difficulty with imitative poetry for Plato is therefore two-fold; it confuses the listener
as to the source of truth and it leads the speaker away from virtue.
What Plato does not emphasize is the distinctive force of the autobiographical
narrative as the imitative poet performs it. The sympathy generated by the very
appearance of a person calling upon our attention may endow the statements of the
imitative poet with a particular force. The story that the autobiographical subject tells is
embodied in the individual in front of the audience, or of the jury, and seems to issue a
demand in the form of that presence.
The metaphors of healing that suffuse Rosenbaum’s book recall Plato, with his
emphasis on analogies with medicine,29 but the medicine that Rosenbaum prescribes is
not one compassed by the ancient philosopher. Although Rosenbaum insists, like Plato,
on attaining the “truth,” his methods of reaching it resort entirely to the autobiographical
moment and remove any external safeguards relating to the presentation of fact.
Dispensing summarily with the rules of evidence and civil procedure as not adequately
respectful of the truth of narrative, Rosenbaum at the same time decries the lack of truth
of many courts’ findings of fact (154).
While maintaining that the truth will inevitably emerge from the fullest possible
set of narratives, Rosenbaum also acknowledges that what he desires to give litigants is
the license of a novelist:
A novelist knows the freedom that comes with narration, the liberty that arises out of
the unconscious self. It brings expression to the soul, putting words in its mouth and
flesh on bones broken by despair. Those wounded by business transactions gone bad,
failed marriages and severed partnerships, negligent merchants, doctors, and serviceproviders, and the mischief of criminals, deserve an equivalent freedom. They need
to be able to experience what the novelist already knows, and what the injured
intuitively sense: that there is no way to heal emotionally from an injury if the story
goes unheard and victims are denied their moral right to testify to their own pain. (61)
The autobiography of the litigants is already, under this account, a fictional construction,
rather than a statement of pre-existing personal fact. As such, it could succumb to the
problem that Plato diagnosed—that of persuading the speaker of the truth of an
exaggerated narrative circumscribed by generic conventions—as well as to the
difficulties in limiting the impact upon the judge and jury of sympathy with an
27
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autobiographical account. Although the rules of evidence and civil procedure may
artificially constrain storytelling, they represent at least an effort to generate a theater of
alienation in which, as in a play by Bertolt Brecht, the illusion is constantly interrupted,
and the audience members are reminded of their status as spectators.30 In the absence of
these techniques for distancing the judge and jury from the litigants’ stories, the court or
the state would have to provide them with critical tools that might take months or years to
instill. Imagine, indeed, the difficulty of recruiting jurors if a three-month institute in
critical thinking were a required prerequisite. Nor would Rosenbaum’s proposal have the
salutary effects on the perpetrators and victims that he imagines. While he envisions the
law court becoming akin to a psychotherapeutic session, the difference of the former
from the latter is that, in therapy, the falsity of the initial narrative one tells about oneself
eventually emerges. Without the resistance represented by the therapist, the promised
self-recognition would not occur in the courtroom.
If The Myth of Moral Justice subscribes, in this way, to “the power of legal
narrative as a tool of liberation,” it also recapitulates part of the humanistic project of law
and literature. Throughout the book, Rosenbaum resorts to literature, drama, and film to
supplement the rigors of the law by providing an emotional and moral vantage point.
Lamenting the separation of law from morality, he identifies Immanuel Kant as the
philosopher responsible for this divide and suggests that it must be eliminated through
law’s reform, by “joining . . . the legal and the moral” and “implant[ing] . . . human
values . . . in the law” (316).31 Inevitably, Shakespeare is one of the authors to whom
Rosenbaum regularly refers. He returns to The Merchant of Venice, in particular, as a
source of moral perspectives on the law. Analysis of the passages that Rosenbaum picks
out from this play, however, and the treatment of the law elsewhere in Shakespeare’s
work demonstrate that Shakespeare is far from suggesting that law and morality become
isomorphic. Indeed, Shakespeare’s concern for and critique of the law focus upon its
inevitably institutional nature. Although Shakespeare represents the processes of law as
imperfect, he simultaneously emphasizes the necessary separation between law and ethics
or religion, just as Kant would later do. Rosenbaum neglects this overarching emphasis
by focusing not on plot or arrangement but rather on the characters’ speeches taken in
isolation.
During The Myth of Moral Justice, Rosenbaum presents several readings of the
central trial scene of The Merchant of Venice.32 At this trial, Shylock attempts to redeem
his bond for a pound of the merchant Antonio’s flesh, and Portia, the wife of Antonio’s
friend Bassanio, who wooed Portia with the money Antonio had borrowed from Shylock,
intervenes in the disguise of a “doctor of laws” from Rome. The Duke of Venice,
30

Bertolt Brecht, “The Street Scene” in Brecht on Theatre: The Development of an
Aesthetic, ed. and trans. John Willett (New York: Hill & Wang, 1992): 121 (discussing
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See generally, William Shakespeare, The Merchant of Venice, act 4, sc. 1, 2d ser.
(London: Arden Shakespeare, 1964).
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presiding over the trial, allows Portia to serve as judge in deciding the legal merits of the
case, although he resumes his position as ultimate arbiter at the conclusion of the trial by
remitting the life of Shylock, who would otherwise have been condemned to death.
Rosenbaum lauds the positions of both Shylock and Portia, emphasizing that
Shylock’s insistence on revenge is a proportionate response to the indignity that he has
suffered at the hands of Antonio and his compatriots, including the elopement of his
daughter (accompanied by his ducats) with one of Antonio’s associates (50-51). At the
same time, Rosenbaum views Portia’s famous “mercy season[s] justice” speech as
providing an alternative, restorative vision of justice (216-18). Nor does he see any
difficulty in the fact that Portia is acting as judge in a case in which her own interests—in
the form of her husband’s friend Antonio and his pound of flesh—are implicated; rather,
Rosenbaum explains, Shakespeare has discerned what is true in all trials, that the judge is
somehow personally implicated (174).
What Rosenbaum fails to account for is the conclusion of the trial. Adopting the
language of the law, Portia outdoes Shylock himself in legalism, and determines that he
cannot spill any blood while cutting the pound of flesh from Antonio’s heart. She then
adduces another statute specifying that, if any alien (including, presumably, Jews)
attempted to kill a citizen of Venice, half of his goods would be forfeited to the intended
victim and half to the state, and his life would lie at the mercy of the Duke of Venice.
The Duke exercises this mercy to spare Shylock’s life, but the grant of pardon partakes
more of a display of power than a restorative impulse. Indeed, it is conditioned on
Shylock’s conversion to Christianity. Although Shylock responds “I am content” in his
penultimate statement in the play, the context demonstrates that he is far from being so.33
The “Christian” mercy that Portia had lauded in the “mercy season[s] justice” speech is
wielded by the Duke to suppress Shylock’s Jewish heritage. The effect of the appearance
of morality in the form of the Christian morality of the Duke and Antonio is to stifle the
competing Jewish religious tradition that Shylock personifies.
The law, although presenting the appearance of injustice, is the medium in The
Merchant of Venice through which the contestation of moral and religious values can
occur. It is only at the point of the exercise of mercy—governed by discretion rather than
law—that religious intolerance intervenes. While a pure pardon or a pure forgiveness
would partake of an unconditional aspect, the Duke’s mercy is granted only as part of an
exchange. This point is equally applicable to contemporary legal proceedings; law—and
precedent—provide the common ground upon which the contestation of disparate visions
of justice can occur. Because several coherent interpretations of such precedent can be
adduced, true argument about what the law is can occur, as Ronald Dworkin contended in
Law’s Empire.34 Conceived of as an institution, law provides a forum and a language for
the articulation of competing moral visions and represents an attempt to deal with deepseated social conflicts through a vocabulary that does not explicitly partake of the values
33
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of one side or the other. Of course, this ideal of institutional objectivity remains in many
respects elusive, or even impossible, as legal realism and critical legal studies have taught
us, but it furnishes an aspiration that is structurally important for the role of law in
society.
Another play, Measure for Measure, more fully elucidates the crucial quality for
Shakespeare of the institutional aspects of law and the problems with conflating the
moral and the legal. The constraints on law as an institution are foregrounded in Measure
for Measure by the appearance of the phrase “city’s institutions,” followed by “the terms
for common justice,” within the opening lines of the play.35 An early use of the word
“institution” in the sense of “an established law, custom, usage, practice, organization, or
other element in the political or social life of a people,” this reference constitutes the only
employment of the term in Shakespeare’s work.36
In Measure for Measure, the Duke of Venice temporarily abdicates his position,
leaving in his place the seemingly saintly, and presumably aptly named Angelo.37
Marked by Puritan characteristics, Angelo immediately reinstates moral legislation that
results in the character Claudio being condemned to death.38 Attracted by the rhetoric
and person of Isabella, Claudio’s sister, however, Angelo claims that he will refrain from
having Claudio executed if Isabella agrees to satisfy his lust. Until the Duke’s return, the
only person to whom Isabella can appeal against Angelo’s injustice is Angelo himself,
placed in the position of ultimate judge. Angelo—who seems initially absolute for the
law—becomes also absolutely personally involved in Claudio’s case. Angelo’s
instatement of moral precepts as law is undercut by his own inability to abide by them,
and his failure to remain objective is exposed as a violation of the fundamental principles
of law. It was only a few years later, in Bonham’s Case, that Sir Edward Coke, in
providing an early example of something like judicial review, insisted upon the idea that
even a statute could not controvert the maxim that one cannot be a judge in one’s own
case.39 By exploring the boundaries of judging in one’s own case in both Measure for
Measure and The Merchant of Venice, Shakespeare did not negate the institutional nature
of law, but rather marked the line in the sand between the institutional and the personal,
and between the legal and the moral.
In this exploration of the institutional aspects of law broadly defined—including
the roles of the judge and jury as decision-makers, the function of precedent, and the
35

William Shakespeare, Measure for Measure, act 1, sc. 1, ll. 10-11, 2d ed. (London:
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mechanisms by which legal determinations are communicated to the public—lies a
potentially productive route for scholarship in law and literature. Under this approach,
literature—also broadly conceived to include a variety of cultural forms—can assist in
understanding the construction of law as an institution and the constraints that this
institutional quality imposes. Literature furthermore provides an ideal medium for testing
the boundaries of law and trying out in theory what might, in future, be implemented in
practice. Along other lines, literature can assist in fleshing out the cultural context of
legal concepts, such as that of the “reasonable person,” to which Rosenbaum several
times refers, or that of “intention.”40 These versions of law and literature acknowledge
the particularity of law, while at the same time refusing to present a mythic “truth” of the
law that can be obtained through recourse to literature. Although no one would aspire to
a prosaic vision of law and literature, it may be worth calling into question the myth of
law and literature that underlies The Myth of Moral Justice.

40
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